Shadow Economy and Poverty by Nikopour, Hesam & Shah Habibullah, Muzafar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Shadow Economy and Poverty
Hesam Nikopour and Muzafar Shah Habibullah
Faculty of Economics and Management University Putra Malaysia
(UPM)
5. June 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23599/
MPRA Paper No. 23599, posted 2. July 2010 13:40 UTC
1 
 
Shadow Economy and Poverty 
Hesam Nikopour 1, Muzafar Shah Habibullah2
 
Abstract 
This study attempts to investigate the relationship between shadow economy and 
poverty by explaining the mechanism through which shadow economy affects poverty 
via its impact on government size and economic growth, and using the human 
poverty index (HPI) for developing and developed countries. In order to achieve this 
objective, the three-way interaction model is utilized using data of 139 developing 
and 23 developed countries separately during 1999-2007. For developing countries 
the dynamic panel system GMM and for developed countries, the fixed and random 
effects method of estimation is used. The results suggest that increasing the shadow 
economy leads to increase poverty in developing countries while it decreases poverty 
in developed countries. 
JEL Classification: O17, I3, C23 
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1. Introduction 
Governments lose a large portion of their revenues through tax evasion, tax avoidance, and 
inefficient fiscal authorities or in sum shadow economy, which can contribute toward 
poverty reduction and promoting sustainable development. 
Poverty alleviation is at the top of the Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) list of 
eight goals. In the year 2000, nearly all heads of states and governments met and 
reaffirmed their faith in the united nation organization (UN) as necessary foundations of a 
more peaceful, prosperous and just world. At this meeting, the MDGs were adopted which 
the first goal is eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
The question of how to finance poverty reduction measures has been a major concern for 
policy makers and international organizations for many years. Although it is useful to 
focus on the quantity and quality of foreign aid and development assistance of donor 
communities, it is not the solution. In the long term, countries can only prevail against their 
dependency on foreign aids when they are able to move enough domestic resources to 
guarantee universal access to essential public goods and services. Politicians and 
international organizations have been frequently emphasizing the importance of mobilizing 
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domestic resources. This issue gained prominence at the UN conference on financing for 
development in Monterrey in 2002. Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
responded to this rather suspiciously. They doubted that governments of wealthy countries 
wanted to divert attention from their responsibilities. 
Recently, civil society organizations have focused more on public revenues in their own 
countries. Among others, redistribution and increased taxation of domestic elites as well as 
examining how public revenues are contributing to fighting poverty and actualizing 
economic, social and cultural rights are most important. 
To reach this goal, designing an efficient tax system that permits governments to increase 
the necessary resources, and transparent and participatory budgets should be noted as the 
starting steps (Martens, 2007). 
However, up to now the mobilization of domestic resources in order to eradicate poverty 
and redistribute income has been facing several internal and external barriers including the 
growth of shadow economy because a significant amount of tax revenues are lost through 
the shadow economy. Cobham (2005) estimates that tax revenues in developing countries 
would produce an additional US$ 252 billion per year if the shadow economy were fully 
integrated into the official economy.  
Although there are some studies3
 
 on the link between shadow economy and income 
inequality, to our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the relationship 
between shadow economy and poverty based on panel data and focusing on capability 
poverty using the human poverty index (HPI). 
Obayelu Abiodun and Larry (2007) in a comparative analysis of the relationship between 
poverty and underground economy using Schneider (2005) shadow economy data of 145 
countries found that “underground economy and poverty have no geographical boundary. 
The incidences of poverty and shadow economy are larger in the poor, developing and 
transition, countries when compared with the highly developed countries. There is also a 
causal link between poverty and underground economy especially in the developing and 
transition countries”. 
There are some critics on this study since they have concluded a causal relationship by 
only comparison of shadow economy and poverty sets of data in different time periods and 
finding the empirical evidence of the relationship between these variables in developing 
countries based on sampling people in Nigeria and interviewing on their opinions about 
underground economy and poverty and the possible causes that may lead them into such 
shadow economy. As it is evident, concluding causal relationship using this approach is 
problematic. They have also not explained theoretically the mechanism through which 
shadow economy affects poverty.   
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2. Relative Literatures and Hypotheses 
An increase in the size of shadow economy affects poverty by reducing state revenues 
through which governments finance poverty reduction and social protection measures. 
Further, shadow economy has direct consequences on tax financed government 
expenditure, government size, and its effects on economic growth, intermediary that in turn 
affects poverty. The latter mechanism is explained by studying the relationship between 
economic growth and poverty as well as the relationship between shadow economy, 
government size and economic growth. 
2.1. The Relationship between Economic Growth and Poverty 
According to Dollar and Kraay (2002), economic growth is the most important determinant 
and the necessary condition for poverty reduction. Although, economic growth does not 
necessarily imply development, however, significant and sustainable growth rates can 
provide the resources that societies need to combat poverty and high levels of deprivation 
and achieve improvements in the human condition (Elu, 2000). Many statistical studies 
have found association between national per capita income and national poverty indicators, 
using both income and non income measures of poverty. 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) in their study of 80 countries, including a period of four decades, 
found that on average the income of the bottom 20 percent of the population rose one-for-
one with the overall growth of the economy as defined by per capita gross GDP. Moreover, 
they found that there is no difference between the income of the poor on average and that 
in rich countries and that policy-induced growth was as good for the poor as it was for the 
overall population. Another study of White and Anderson (2001) also shows that the 
“growth effect” is dominated, while the “distribution effect” being important in only a 
minority of cases. These studies establish only association and not causation. In fact, the 
causality could well go the other way. In these cases, poverty eradication could be 
necessary to implement stable macroeconomic policies or to achieve higher growth. 
In the transition countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the conversion to a market 
system was correlated with a rapid initial reduction in output and higher levels of poverty. 
The increasing of poverty was initiated by the collapse of GDP, which fell by 50 percent in 
the FSU countries and 15 percent in Central and Eastern Europe (World Bank, 2000). 
Gupta et al. (1998) in their study of a cross-national analysis to investigate the relationship 
between growth and poverty found that higher growth is correlated with poverty reduction. 
They used income growth of the bottom quintile as the dependent variable and growth in 
GNP, natural resources, initial income of the lower quintile, initial secondary schooling, 
education inequality, and initial distribution of assets, social spending and growth in 
corruption were used as explanatory variables.  
Quibria (2002) in his study provides a good example of sharp economic growth conducting 
to a decrease in poverty incidence. However, income distribution did not change over the 
period of growth even in this special case of rapid growth. Easterly (2001) using data from 
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Ravallion, and Chen, (1997), found that the incidence of poverty was reduced in countries 
with positive economic growth during 1981-1999, although it is concluded that “measures 
of inequality show no tendency to get either better or worse with economic growth.” 
Summarizing, the results of studies show that income increases with economic growth and 
vice versa. It should be noted that economic growth does not necessarily lead to more 
equal income distribution an increase in income may benefit the rich rather than bringing 
the poor out of poverty. Thus, it is not the pro-poor growth. Some define pro-poor growth 
as economic growth that benefits the poor relatively more than the non-poor (Pernia, 
2003). Others define it as “economic growth that is associated with reductions in absolute 
poverty” (Ravallion and Chen, 1997 and DFID, 2004). For the purposes of this study, it is 
not necessary to discuss which one of these definitions is preferred. The most important 
point, which there is little disagreement about it, is that income distribution is an important 
factor in the relationship between economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
2.2. The Relationship between Shadow Economy, Government Size and Economic 
Growth 
Shadow economy grows when individuals choose the “exit” option rather than “voice” 
option as the reaction to increasing burdens (Schneider and Enste, 2000).  
In modern societies government has a deep role including setting rules and laws,  
defending against external forces, supplying public goods and services, providing 
infrastructure, providing security and justice, and undertaking policies to facilitate 
domestic calmness. However, the power of government may enhance general welfare or 
erode it. Friedman (1997) observed that “Government has an essential role to play in a free 
and open society. Its average contribution is positive; but I believe that the marginal 
contribution of going from 15% of the national income to 50% has been negative.” Karras 
(1996) noted that “the optimal government size is 23 percent for the average country but 
ranges from 14 percent for the average OECD country to 33 percent in South America; and 
the marginal productivity of government services is negatively related to government size.” 
(karras, 1996) 
In their study, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995) argue that increasing government expenditure 
cannot be justified by social improvements since “Higher spending on social programs has 
not commensurately improved critical social indicators such as life expectancy, infant 
mortality, or school enrolment, suggesting that increases in public spending are not 
necessarily productive beyond a certain level”. Gupta et al., (2001) also conclude that 
“Government spending needs to be no higher than 30 percent of GDP to achieve socially 
desirable goals” Thus, large size governments do not work better than small governments 
to reach these goals. 
Armey (1995) by introducing the Armey curve illustrates the existence of a government 
share of GDP that maximizes GDP growth (an optimal size of government).  
5 
 
When private and government sectors decide together on resource allocation, output often 
is larger. With a small government, increasing government size is associated with output 
enhancing. However, more expansion in government size leads to diminishing output 
enhancing aspects of government and further expansion of it conduces to economic 
stagnation and decline.  
By growing governments, the diminishing returns law begins. Although providing 
infrastructure such as building roads assists output expansion, the construction of 
secondary roads have less marginal positive impact. Moreover, by increasing tax rates and 
enforcing new taxes with adverse effects on economic behaviour, financing government 
expenditure through tax or borrowing imposes increasing burdens. Thus, new government 
spending no longer increases economic growth (Atukeren, 2005). 
As mentioned in the text, the relationship between government expenditures and economic 
performance is a subject of continuing discussion in economics and public policy making. 
On the one hand, increased government size may distort the economic and political 
environment and crowd out private sector investments. On the other hand, through 
investment in physical and human capital infrastructures such as education and health, the 
government may contribute to development of private sector. Therefore, government 
involvement leads to crowd in private sector investments by provision of physical, legal, 
and human capital infrastructure (Gramlich, 1994). This argument is especially valid in a 
developing country framework.  
The literature on this topic shows that in contrast to the neoclassical points of view which 
advocate crowding out, the Keynesian school believes that increasing government 
spending stimulates the domestic economic activity and crowds in private investment. 
According to the Ricardian Equivalence theorem, “increases in deficit financed by fiscal 
spending will be matched with a future increase in taxes and so they leave interest rates 
and private investment unchanged” (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1999). 
In empirical studies, the government involvement in the economy is generally explained by 
a widely defined government size variable that also includes other government 
consumption items, public sector wages and salaries and transfer payments. However, even 
by using such aggregate government size variable, the empirical studies on the effects of 
government size on economic performance show different results. For example, Ram 
(1986), Aschauer (1989), Dowrick (1996), Sanchez-Robles (1998), Fan and Rao (2003) 
and, Esfahani and Ramires (2003) find evidence that increases government size are 
positively correlated with economic growth. 
Landau (1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Peden and Bradley (1989), Barro (1991), 
Gwartney et al. (1998), Dar and Amirkhalkhalim (2002), Folster and Herkson (2001), Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003), Mo (2007) and, Higgins et al., (2009), among others, do not 
support these conclusions, and report a negative relationship, while Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) find no relationship. Terasawa and Gates (1998) argue that the relationship between 
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government size and economic growth is positive in less developed countries and a 
negative relationship arises in developed countries. 
Terasawa and Gates (1998) assume that by increasing the level of development, the share 
of productive government spending decreases and the share of unproductive items 
increases.  
It is generally expected that shadow economy affects the tax system structure, the tax 
financed government expenditure (government size) and it’s crowding out or crowding in 
effects on private sector investment and the economic growth in a dynamic sense.  
Considering both lines of theoretical argument about the effects of government size on 
economic growth, the effects of an increase in the size of the shadow economy on 
economic growth may be ambiguous. Since researchers such as Terasawa and Gates 
(1998) argue that the relationship between government size and economic growth is 
positive in less developed and negative in developed countries, the relationship between 
shadow economy and economic growth may depends on the level of development.  
Schneider (2005) by estimating a basic equation for a sample of 110 developing and 
developed countries with further estimates for two separate sub samples of 21 OECD 
countries and 89 developing and transition countries, point out all three sets of regression 
show that shadow economy has a significant influence on official economic growth. This 
influence is positive for transition and OECD countries and negative for developing 
countries.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
In sum, increasing the shadow economy decreases tax revenues as the main financial 
resource of government expenditure (government size) which in turn may have positive 
(neoclassical view) or negative (Keynesian view) effects on economic growth rate. Since 
economic growth is the most important factor influencing poverty, increasing the shadow 
economy may lead to decrease or increase poverty depends on the level of development. 
Thus, following hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing the shadow economy leads to increase poverty in developing 
countries, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2: Increasing the shadow economy leads to decrease poverty in developed 
countries, ceteris paribus. 
3. Model  
Since economic growth and government size affects on shadow economy and all three 
together affects on poverty, this study specifies the model using three-way interaction 
between shadow economy, government size and economic growth, as follows: 
tititititi
tititititi
ZgGovshadowgGovgshadow
GovshadowgGovshadowPoverty
,,,7,6,5
,4,3,2,1,
)()()(
)()()()(
εγβββ
ββββα
++××+×+×+
×++++=
       (1) 
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where, tiPoverty ,  is the human poverty index for country i in period t . )(shadow is the 
shadow economy, )(Gov  is the government consumption (government size), )(g  is the 
economic growth rate, )( Govshadow× is the interaction term of shadow economy and 
government size, )( gshadow× is the interaction term between shadow economy and 
economic growth, )( gGov×  is the interaction term of government size and economic 
growth, )( gGovshadow ××  is the interaction term between shadow economy, government 
size and economic growth and tiZ , is a set of conditioning information for country i in 
period t . tiZ ,  includes, governance and  rural population. 
Governance: Kaufmann et al. (1999, 2004) define governance as, “The traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by 
which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.”  
Better governance reduces poverty in different dimensions including empowerment, 
capabilities, opportunities, and security. The poor can influence policy making, budget 
priorities, and program designing through participating in political and administrative 
processes. 
Government has also a key role in defining the rules governing access to private markets. 
The poor may not access to markets of lands, credit and labor due to social exclusion. Lack 
of physical access to markets limits the available opportunities to the poor to enter in more 
profitable activities, which is important for reducing vulnerability to agricultural shocks. 
Thus, Governments need to reform the regulations to improve market access, and distribute 
information to the poor about opportunities for employment, asset ownership, and local 
and international prices as the measures of poverty reduction.  
By improving justice system and limiting exploitation by police, governments can also 
reduce vulnerability to crime, violence, and corruption of the poor  
(Girishankar et al., 2002). 
Rural Population:  In most developing countries the likelihood of being poor and the 
severity of poverty are more in rural areas due to five characteristics of rural space; a 
strong dependency on the natural resource base to sustain livelihoods leading to high risk 
environment, a low population density and geographic constraints leading to high 
transaction costs and reduced access to physical and social infrastructure, an informal 
economy, which makes it more difficult for policy makers to provide targeted poverty 
reduction measures, cultural and linguistic differences leading to limited voice and 
participation in national and even local decision making processes, not recognizing the 
important role of women in income generating programs (Cord, 2002). Despite the rural 
sector’s importance to strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction, rural 
stakeholders often find their interests poorly represented in national policymaking 
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processes. Nearly 75 percent of the world’s poor are located in rural areas, and at current 
trends the global percentage of poor in rural areas will not fall below 50 percent before 
2035 (Ravallion, 2000 and Alderman, 2001). Hence it is expected rural population 
positively influences poverty. 
4. Econometric Methodology  
Multiple regression models often contain interaction terms. First off, let’s start with what a 
significant continuous by continuous interaction means. It means that the slope of one 
continuous variable on the response variable changes as the values on a second continuous 
change. If there is a moderator variable which influences the regression of the dependent 
variable on an independent/predictor variable, the regression model has a significant two-
way interaction of continuous variables. In the formula (2), Y is the response variable, X 
the predictor (independent) variable with Z being the moderator variable. The term XZ is 
the interaction of the predictor with the moderator.  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑍𝑍 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍    (2) 
 If there are two moderator variables which jointly influence the regression of the 
dependent variable on an independent variable, the regression model has a significant 
three-way interaction of continuous variables. In the formula (3), Y is the response 
variable, X the predictor (independent) variable with Z and W being the two moderator 
variables.  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑍𝑍 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑊𝑊 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑋𝑋𝑊𝑊 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊     (3) 
To explain a three-way interaction, simple slopes, i.e., the slopes of the dependent variable 
on the independent variable when the moderator variables are held constant at different 
combinations of high and low values, are computed. This method is adapted by Dawson 
and Richter (2004).  
The terms can be reordered into two groups, the first grouping (terms that do not contain 
X) defines the intercept while the second grouping (all the terms that contain an X) defines 
the simple slope.  
𝑌𝑌 = (𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑍𝑍 + 𝑏𝑏3𝑊𝑊 + 𝑏𝑏6𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊) + (𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑍𝑍 + 𝑏𝑏5𝑊𝑊 + 𝑏𝑏7𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊)𝑋𝑋    (4) 
Next, high values (one standard deviation above the means) of Z and W will be defined as 
being one standard deviation above their respective means and will be denoted as Hz and 
Hw. The low values (one standard deviation below the means) will be defined as one 
standard deviation below their means and will be noted as Lz and Lw. Altogether there are 
four possible combinations of conditions:  
1) High value of z and high value of w (HzHw)  
2) High value of z and low value of w (HzLw)  
3) Low value of z and high value of w (LzHw)   
4) Low value of z and low value of w (LzLw)   
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Here are the formulas for the simple slope and intercept for condition 1) when both Z and 
W are at their high values. The formulas for the other three conditions are exactly the same 
except that the values for Z and W are different.  
simple slope 1 = b1 + b4Hz + b5Hw + b7HzHw 
                                    intercept 1 =  b0 + b2Hz + b3Hw + b6HzHw 
After computing the slopes and intercepts for each of the four regression lines, four simple 
regression lines can be plotted.  
As the right-hand-side variables in equation (1) may be endogenous, the dynamic panel 
system GMM estimator is used. However, since computing human poverty index as a 
measure of capability poverty is different for developing and developed countries, the 
GMM method of estimation cannot be used to study the effects of shadow economy on 
poverty for developed countries due to limitation of cross sections and the fixed and 
random effects method is used. 
5. Data 
Until few years ago, quantitative analyses of interactions between variables such as 
shadow economy, indexes of rules of law, corruption and economic freedom have been 
virtually impossible. Fortunately, the recent availability of data on the scope of shadow 
economy now makes such a study possible. In particular, Schneider et al. (2010) estimate 
of the shadow economy as percentage of official GDP is used.  The collected data set 
consists for 139 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1999-2007. 
Shadow economy: The shadow economy includes all market-based legal goods and 
services production that are on purpose hidden from public authorities for the following 
reasons:  
1) Tax evasion, 
2) Avoiding the social insurance contribution payment, 
3) Refusing to observe specified legal measures such as minimum wage, 
maximum work hours and protective or health measures, and  
4) Refusing to observe specified administrative methods and procedures such as 
completion of statistical questionnaires, escaping bureaucratic formalities etc. 
In this study, the shadow economies data constructed by Schneider et al. (2010) based on 
the DYMIMIC and currency demand method is used. 
Human Poverty Index (HPI): The HPI-1 is the human poverty index for developing 
countries. It is discarded income in the variable mix and included only “the most basic 
dimensions of deprivation: a short life, lack of basic education, and lack of access to public 
and private resources” (Doraid, 1997). The formula used to calculate the HPI-1 is:  
HPI-1 ( )[ ] αααα /13213/1 PPP ++=  
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Where: 1P = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100), 2P = Adult illiteracy 
rate, 3P = 1/2(population not using an improved water source) + 1/2(children under weight 
for age), 3=α  
For selected OECD countries, the HPI-2 is the human poverty index. It measures 
deprivations in the same basic dimensions at the HPI-1 and also captures social exclusion. 
Thus it reflects deprivations in four dimensions. The formula used to calculate the HPI-2 is 
as follows: 
HPI-2 ( )[ ] ααααα /143214/1 PPPP +++=  
Where: 1P = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60(times 100), 2P = Percentage of 
adults lacking functional literacy skills, 3P = Percentage of population below income 
poverty line (50% of the median adjusted household disposable income), 4P = Rate of long 
term unemployment (lasting 12 months or more), 3=α  
Governance: The institutional quality data sets we employed in the analysis are newly 
assembled dataset by Kaufmann et al. (2008). These indicators are constructed based on 
information gathered through a wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as polls of 
experts. Kaufmann et al. (2008) use a model of unobserved components, which enables 
them to achieve levels of coverage of approximately 212 countries for each of their 
indicators. They construct six different indicators, each representing a different dimension 
of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political Stability and Lack of Violence, 
(iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv)Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule of Law, and (vi) Control of 
Corruption. The definition of the above institutional quality indicators are provided in 
Table 2 (Appendix).  
Due to collinearity between these indicators, the average of voice and accountability, and 
political stability, is defined as the political freedom and stability and average of 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption as the government 
efficiency (Law and Azman-Saini, 2008).  
6. Empirical Results  
To investigate the relationship between shadow economy and poverty, two cases are 
considered (i) shadow economy and poverty in developing countries, and (ii) shadow 
economy and poverty in developed countries because computing human poverty index as a 
measure of capability poverty is different for developing and developed countries. 
Therefore, the GMM method of estimation cannot be used to study this relationship for 
developed countries due to limitation of cross sections the fixed and random effects 
method is used4
                                                             
4- Table 5 shows the results of GMM-SYS and GLS estimation of the relationship between shadow economy 
and poverty for developed countries. 
.  
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6.1. Dynamic Panel Data Estimator for Poverty and Shadow Economy in Developing 
Countries 
To empirically test the relationship between shadow economy and poverty, a  
three-way interaction model is considered. This model is explored using two step system 
GMM method with t-values and test statistics that are asymptotically robust to general 
heteroscedasticity and corrected for a small sample bias. The estimates of relationship 
between poverty and shadow economy in developing countries are presented in Table 1 
which its columns present different specifications. In all models the variables of interest 
are shadow economy and the interaction term between shadow economy, government size 
and economic growth.  
There is no control variable in specification 1. This typical econometric model is used as 
the base of econometric estimations; but as the robustness check in specification 2, rural 
population (% of total population) and political freedom and stability are considered as 
control variables. Both models include a set of year dummies. In all specifications, year 
dummies and levels equation are used as instrument variables because all other regressors 
are not strictly exogenous. The poverty equation for developing countries fits the data well 
as indicated by the regression statistics. In all specifications, according to AR(1) and 
AR(2) statistics5
In both specifications, the coefficients of interaction term between shadow economy and 
economic growth and also shadow economy and government size, are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. These results indicate that while increasing economic 
growth and government consumption decreases poverty, the increased economic growth 
and government consumption accompanied by shadow economy is not pro poor and 
increases poverty in developing countries. 
, selection of one lag period is needed for dependent variable (poverty) in 
order to rid the serial correlation of residuals. 
In both specifications, the coefficients of shadow economy and the interaction term 
between shadow economy, government size and economic growth are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that increasing the shadow economy leads to 
increase poverty in developing countries. 
The coefficient of economic growth (g) is negative and significant at 1% level. This 
negative effect is expected as economic growth is the most important factor influencing 
poverty. This result is consistent with the results of numerous statistical studies finding a 
strong association between economic growth and poverty indictors, both income and non-
income measures of poverty.  
The coefficient of (Gov) is negative as expected and statistically significant at 1% level in 
both specifications. This negative effect indicates that increasing government consumption 
(government size) on social services such as health and education could benefit the poor. 
                                                             
5 - In general, an optimum lag period is determined by rendering the panel VAR residual free of serial 
correlation. Therefore, the optimal lag is selected until no serial correlation in residual is obtained (Arellano, 
2003). 
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In specifications 1 and 2, the coefficient of interaction term between economic growth and 
government size, is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. This result is 
supported by Keynesian school of thought that believes an increase in the government 
spending stimulates the domestic economic activity and crowds in private investment and 
increase economic growth. Increasing economic growth in turn decreases poverty.  
In specification 2, the lagged coefficient of rural population is positive and significant at 
1% level indicating that in developing countries the likelihood of being poor and the 
severity of poverty are more in rural areas. This result is in accord with Cord (2002).  
The coefficient of political freedom and stability is negative and significant at 5% level in 
specification 2. These results are consistent with Girishankar et al. (2002) which argue that 
political freedom and stability reduces poverty in different dimensions including 
empowerment, capabilities, opportunities, and security.  
Three types of diagnostic test are used for the empirical models. First, the Sargan test of 
identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).  The results of the Sargan test in system GMM estimator are 
reported in Table 1. Based on the Sargan test statistic for all models, the high p-value 
indicates that the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restrictions fail to reject. 
Therefore, the Sargan test statistics indicate that all specifications are well specified and 
that the instrument vector is appropriate.  
The second test is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which examines the hypothesis 
that the residual from the estimated regressions is first-order correlated but not second-
order correlated. The second test examines the statistics (AR(1) and AR(2)) for presence of 
serial correlation in the first differenced residuals of first and second order, reported as the 
asymptotically standard normal distribution values. The results of the test for first-order 
autocorrelation AR(1) indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected, the p-values of the 
Arellano and Bond statistics reported in Table 1 are significant at 1% level.  
The test results for second-order autocorrelation AR(2) fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation and the statistics reported are p-values, giving the probability of 
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The absence of serial 
correlation shows the differenced residuals by significant negative first-order serial 
correlation and no second-order serial correlation. Therefore, the Arellano-Bond test 
statistics show that the instruments used are independent of the error term, no 
autocorrelation, and hence appropriate for the estimation, overall, the first and the second 
order serial correlation tests are all satisfied. The third test statistics also reject the null 
hypothesis that the time dummies are jointly equal to zero at 1% level. 
For computing the main effect of shadow economy on poverty, there are four possible 
combinations depends on high, one standard deviation above the means, and low, one 
standard deviation below the means, values of economic growth and government size as 
moderators: 
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1) High value of economic growth and high value of government size (HgHgov)  
2) High value of economic growth and low value of government size (HgLgov)  
3) Low value of economic growth and high value of government size (LgHgov)   
4) Low value of economic growth and low value of government size (LgLgov)   
Appendix A shows how to compute intercepts and slopes using STATA 10.  
Table 3 indicates the slopes and the intercepts with high and low moderator.   
As shown in Table 3, in model 1, the main positive effects of shadow economy on poverty 
in developing countries are statistically significant at 1% level, only when high values of 
government size and high and low values of economic growth are considered and equal to 
0.239 and 0.129 respectively. In model 2, the main positive effect of shadow economy on 
poverty are statistically significant at 1% level, only when high values of economic growth 
and government size is considered and equal to 0.236. Figure 1 plot the relationship 
between poverty and shadow economy with high and low moderators in developing 
countries. 
6.2. Fixed and Random Effects Estimator for Poverty and Shadow Economy in 
Developed Countries 
To empirically test the hypothesis indicating that increasing the shadow economy leads to 
decrease poverty in developed countries, a three way interaction model using fixed and 
random effects methods of estimation is applied. The regression results for the fixed and 
random effects in different specifications are presented in Table 2. The Hausman test 
statistics equals to 60.39 and 53.69 and statistically significant. Therefore, it rejects the null 
hypothesis that the model is random, suggesting the fixed effects model is better than the 
random effects one. The Wald test statistics reject the null hypothesis that the explanatory 
variables are jointly equal to zero at the one percent level. 
In all models the variables of interest are shadow economy and the interaction term 
between shadow economy, government size and economic growth. In model 1, there is no 
control variable while in model 2, political freedom and stability is considered as control 
variable.  
In both specifications, the coefficients of shadow economy and the interaction term 
between shadow economy, government size and economic growth are negative and 
statistically significant at 10% level or better, indicating that increasing the shadow 
economy leads to decrease poverty in developed countries. 
The time dummies in model 1 are positive and statistically significant at 5% level or better, 
indicating that in developed countries, capability poverty has increased in recent years. 
The coefficient of economic growth (g) is negative and significant at 10% level. This 
negative effect is expected as economic growth is the most important factor in influencing 
poverty. This result is consistent with the results of numerous statistical studies finding a 
strong association between economic growth and poverty indictors, both income and non-
income measures of poverty.  
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The coefficient of (Gov) is negative as expected and statistically significant at 1% level in 
both specifications. This negative effect indicates that increasing government consumption 
(government size) on social services such as health and education could benefit the poor.  
In both specifications, the coefficients of interaction term between shadow economy and 
economic growth and also shadow economy and government size, are positive and 
statistically significant at 10% level or better. These results indicate that while increasing 
economic growth and government consumption decreases poverty, the increased economic 
growth and government consumption accompanied by shadow economy is not pro poor 
and increases poverty in developed countries. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between economic growth and government size is 
positive and statistically significant at 10% level in specification 2 while this positive 
effect is not significant in specification 1. This result is supported by neoclassical school of 
thought believes that an increased government involvement in the economy might distort 
the economic and political environment of business and discourage or crowd out private 
sector investments and decreases economic growth. Decreasing economic growth in turn 
increases poverty. 
In specification 2, the coefficient of political freedom and stability is negative and 
significant at 10% level. These results are consistent with Girishankar et al. (2002), who 
argue that political freedom and stability reduces poverty in different dimensions including 
empowerment, capabilities, opportunities, and security.  
For computing the main effect of shadow economy on poverty, there are four possible 
combinations depends on high, one standard deviation above the means, and low, one 
standard deviation below the means, values of economic growth and government size as 
moderators: 1) HgHgov, 2) HgLgov, 3) LgHgov and 4) LgLgov. Table 4 indicates the 
slopes and the intercepts with high and low moderator.   
As shown in Table 4, in model 1, the negative effect of shadow economy on poverty in 
developed countries considering HgHgov, HgLgov, LgHgov, and LgLgov are statistically 
significant at 5% level or better and equal to -2.260, -3.656, -2.201 and -3.954 respectively. 
In model 2, the main negative effects of shadow economy on poverty in developed 
countries are statistically significant at 1% level only when low values of government size 
and high and low values of economic growth are considered and equal to -1.954 and -2.279 
respectively. Figure 2 plot the relationship between poverty and shadow economy with 
high and low moderators in developed countries. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
The empirical results of this study indicate that in developing countries, increasing shadow 
economy leads to increase poverty considering high value of government size and in 
developed countries, shadow economy decreases poverty when low value of government 
size is taken into account.  
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From a public choice perspective a government may not have a strong interest to reduce 
the shadow economy to a large extent due to the facts, that tax losses may be moderate as a 
large amount of the income earned in the shadow economy is immediately spend in the 
official economy. Similarly, income earned in the shadow economy increases the standard 
of living of a large portion of working population and the decline of the shadow economy 
will increase the social welfare only if a larger part of production and labour is transferred 
into the official economy, and also people who work in the shadow economy have less 
time for other things like to go on demonstrations, etc. However, the empirical results of 
this study show that only for developed countries, increases shadow economy decreases 
poverty and for developing countries it increases poverty. In fact, as the results show, 
shadow economy cannot increase social welfare for developing countries. Therefore: 
1. In order to raise the necessary resources for financing of key development tasks 
outlined in the MDGs, developing governments need to overcome shadow 
economy. 
 
2. The social welfare effects of the shadow economy in developed countries should 
not be considered as a reason for moving into shadow economy. It implicitly 
suggests that the size of government should be optimal.  
 
In terms of further studies, one may consider the optimal size of government with respect 
to different measures of social welfare constructed by UNDP, such as Human 
Development Index (HDI), HPI, the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and the 
Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) instead of considering the optimal size of 
government with respect to GDP measures. 
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Table 1: The Estimated Results from the Two Step Dynamic Panel GMM-SYS (Effects of 
Shadow Economy on Poverty in Developing Countries) 
Dependent variable: ( )tHPI1log  Model (1) Model (2) 
( ) 11log −tHPI  0.946 (63.83)*** 
0.805  
(20.31)*** 
( )tshadowslog  0.925 (3.33)*** 
0.978  
(3.49)*** 
( )tGovlog  -1.086 (-2.97)*** 
-1.112  
(-2.82)*** 
( )tglog  -0.887 (-3.35)*** 
-1.088  
(-3.43)*** 
tt Govshadows )log()log( ×  0.287 (2.94)*** 
0.300  
(2.93)*** 
tt gshadows )log()log( ×  0.226 (3.15)*** 
0.281  
(3.31)*** 
tt gGov )log()log( ×  -0.278 (-3.17)*** 
-0.307  
(-3.04)*** 
ttt gGovshadows )log()log()log( ××  0.070 (2.92)*** 
0.077  
(2.85)*** 
1)log( −trural   0.295  (2.62)*** 
( )treedompoliticalflog   -0.038  (-2.40)** 
2000dummy  -0.042 
(-3.82)*** 
-0.027  
(-2.52)** 
2004dummy  -0.019 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.010  
(-2.48)** 
2005dummy  -0.020 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.017  
(-3.64)*** 
2006dummy  -0.119 
(-13.86)*** 
-0.119  
(-15.03)*** 
2007dummy  -0.046 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.055  
(-6.04)*** 
cons−  -3.321 
(-3.27)*** 
-4.055  
(-3.93)*** 
Number of observation 611 605 
Number of groups 113 112 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.000 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.166 0.056 
Sargan test of overid.  (p value) 0.702 0.386 
Wald test ( )0:0 =tdummyH  (298.79)*** (460.40)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations (Stata 
xtdpdsys command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 
Significant at the 5 percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 2: The Estimated Results from the Panel Fixed and Random Effects (Effect of Shadow 
Economy on Poverty in Developed Countries) 
Dependent variable: 
tHPI )2log(   
 Model (1) Model (2) 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
( )tshadowslog  -16.633 (-6.35)*** 
-6.075 
(-2.88)*** 
-16.418 
(-6.05)*** 
-5.034 
(-2.67)*** 
( )tGovlog  -11.689  (-5.03)*** 
-5.421 
(-2.80)*** 
-12.901 
(-5.29)*** 
-4.533 
(-2.65)*** 
( )tglog  -4.119 (-1.68)* 
-5.870 
(-2.13)** 
-4.396 
(-1.77)* 
-5.786 
(-2.04)** 
tt Govshadows )log()log( ×  4.595 (5.36)*** 
2.056 
(2.83)*** 
5.124 
(5.76)*** 
1.675 
(2.60)*** 
tt gshadows )log()log( ×  1.748 (1.88)* 
2.395 
(2.28)** 
1.852 
(1.95)* 
2.389 
(2.22)** 
tt gGov )log()log( ×  1.339 (1.61) 
1.959 
(2.09)** 
1.430 
(1.70)* 
1.949 
(2.02)** 
ttt gGovshadows )log()log()log( ××  -0.568 (-1.80)* 
-0.797 
(-2.25)** 
-0.599 
(-1.87)* 
-.801 
(-2.20)** 
( )treedompoliticalflog    -0.488 (-1.73)* 
-.947 
(-4.15)*** 
2004dummy  
0.075 
(2.17)** 
0.057 
(1.69)* 
  
2005dummy  0.097 (2.76)*** 
0.053 
(1.59) 
  
2006dummy  0.119 (2.65)*** 
0.056 
(1.41) 
  
2007dummy  0.132 (2.83)*** 
0.025 
(0.74) 
  
cons−  45.201 
(6.34)*** 
18.338 
(3.28)*** 
46.047 
(5.83)*** 
20.190 
(3.86)*** 
Observations 
Groups 
Hausman test 
153 
23 
 
153 
23 
60.39  
(0.000) 
153 
23 
153 
23 
53.69  
(0.000) 
𝐑𝐑𝟐𝟐 0.33 0.16 0.29 0.43 
Wald test (5.33)*** (16.17) (6.11)*** (26.12)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the fixed and random effects estimations (Stata xtreg command). 
Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level and * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 3: Slopes and Intercepts with High and Low Moderator, Developing Countries 
 
Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
HgHgov -0.727 
(-4.05)*** 
0.239 
(4.36)*** 
-0.336 
(-1.28) 
0.236 
(4.08)*** 
HgLgov 0.005 
(0.04) 
0.042 
(1.27) 
0.399 
(1.65) 
0.034 
(0.61) 
LgHgov -0.311 
(-2.36)** 
0.129 
(2.98)*** 
0.285 
(1.12) 
0.070 
(1.31) 
LgLgov 0.071 
(0.42) 
0.021 
(0.48) 
0.633 
(2.50)** 
-0.032 
(-0.54) 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are z-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 
percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 4: Slopes and Intercepts with High and Low Moderator, Developed Countries 
 
Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope 
HgHgov 8.634 
(3.64)*** 
-2.260 
(-2.62)*** 
3.511 
(2.25)*** 
-0.375 
(-0.67) 
HgLgov 12.255 
(5.20)*** 
-3.656 
(-4.29)*** 
7.538 
(4.66)*** 
-1.954 
(-3.32)*** 
LgHgov 8.489 
(3.57)*** 
-2.201 
(-2.55)** 
3.355 
(2.14)** 
-0.323 
(-0.58) 
LgLgov 12.952 
(5.54)*** 
-3.954 
(-4.68)*** 
8.282 
(5.16)*** 
-2.279 
(-3.90)*** 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 
percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5: Effects of Shadow Economy on Poverty in Developed Countries 
Dependent variable: ( )tHPI 2log  GMM-SYS  GLS 
( ) 12log −tHPI  1.256 (4.70)***  
( )tshadowslog  -14.230 (-2.17)** 
-2.089 
(-1.30) 
( )tGovlog  -13.647 (-2.30)** 
-2.325 
(-1.63)  
( )tglog  -9.712 (-2.57)** 
-7.536 
(-1.97)** 
tt Govshadows )log()log( ×  4.766 (2.24)** 
0.725 
(1.34) 
tt gshadows )log()log( ×  3.859 (2.71)*** 
3.070 
(2.15)** 
tt gGov )log()log( ×  3.124 (2.48)** 
2.717 
(2.08)** 
ttt gGovshadows )log()log()log( ××  -1.240 (-2.62)*** 
-1.094 
(-2.26)** 
( )treedompoliticalflog   -1.490 (-8.84)*** 
2002dummy  0.049 
(3.17)***  
2003dummy  0.084 
(3.50)***  
2004dummy  0.117 
(4.42)***  
2005dummy  0.073 
(3.77)***  
cons−  39.976 
(2.24)** 
15.753 
(3.61)*** 
Number of observation 131 153 
Number of groups 19 23 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.368  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.429  
Sargan test of overid.  (p value) 1.000  
Wald test ( )0:0 =tdummyH  (24.30)***  
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 
percent level and * Significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Figure 1: The Relationship between Shadow Economy and Poverty with High and Low 
Moderator, Developing Countries 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Relationship between Shadow Economy and Poverty with High and Low 
Moderator, Developed Countries 
 
 
 
Table 6: Sources and Characteristics of Sample Data 
Variables Unit  Abbreviation Mean SD Min Max Obs. Data Source 
Shadow Economy % of GDP shadows  34.4 13.3 8.4 72.5 1429 Schneider et al. (2010) 
Economic growth  % g  4.6 4.6 -31.3 62.3 1415 WDI 
Government 
Consumption  % of GDP Gov  15.5 6.3 2.8 69.5 1338 WDI 
Rural Population % of total population rural  48.5 23.9 0 91.6 1104 WDI 
Political Freedom 
and Stability 
Standard 
deviation reedompoliticalf  46.6 26.1 1.0 99.7 1458 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2008) 
Human Poverty 
Index (developing 
countries) 
% 1HPI  26.2 15.5 1.5 65.5 871 HDR, UNDP 
Human Poverty 
Index (developed 
countries) 
% 2HPI  11.5 3.8 6 29.9 163 HDR, UNDP 
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Table 7: Countries included in the Analysis 
Albania  Dominican Republic  Latvia  Russian Federation  
Algeria  Ecuador  Lebanon  Rwanda  
Angola  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Lesotho  Saudi Arabia  
Argentina  El Salvador  Liberia  Senegal  
Armenia  Equatorial Guinea  Libyan Arab  Sierra Leone  
Australia  Eritrea  Lithuania  Singapore  
Austria  Estonia  Luxembourg  Slovak Republic  
Azerbaijan  Ethiopia  Macao, China  Slovenia  
Bahamas Fiji  Macedonia, FYR  Solomon Islands  
Bahrain  Finland  Madagascar  South Africa  
Bangladesh  France  Malawi  Spain  
Belarus  Gabon  Malaysia  Sri Lanka  
Belgium  Gambia Maldives  Sudan  
Belize  Georgia  Mali  Suriname  
Benin  Germany  Malta  Swaziland  
Bhutan  Ghana  Mauritania  Sweden  
Bolivia  Greece  Mauritius  Switzerland  
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Guatemala  Mexico  Syrian Arab Republic  
Botswana  Guinea  Moldova  Taiwan  
Brazil  Guinea-Bissau  Mongolia  Tajikistan  
Brunei Darussalam  Guyana  Morocco  Tanzania  
Bulgaria  Haiti  Mozambique  Thailand  
Burkina Faso  Honduras  Myanmar  Togo  
Burundi  Hong Kong, China  Namibia  Trinidad and Tobago  
Cambodia  Hungary  Nepal  Tunisia  
Cameroon  Iceland  Netherlands  Turkey  
Canada  India  New Zealand  Uganda  
Cape Verde  Indonesia  Nicaragua  Ukraine  
Central African  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Niger  United Arab Emirates  
Chad  Ireland  Nigeria  United Kingdom  
Chile  Israel  Norway  United States  
China  Italy  Oman  Uruguay  
Colombia  Jamaica  Pakistan  Venezuela  
Comoros  Japan  Panama  Vietnam  
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Jordan  Papua New Guinea  Yemen, Rep.  
Congo, Rep.  Kazakhstan  Paraguay  Zambia  
Costa Rica  Kenya  Peru  Zimbabwe  
Côte d'Ivoire  Korea, Rep.  Philippines   
Croatia  Kuwait  Poland   
Cyprus  Kyrgyz Republic  Portugal   
Czech Republic  Lao PDR  Qatar   
Denmark  Dominican Republic  Romania   
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Appendix A: Do-File to Make Three-Way Interaction Model (STATA 10) 
 
rename lHPI y 
rename lshadow x 
rename lgov w 
rename lg z 
rename lrural v1 
rename lpolitical v2 
 
generate xz  = x*z 
generate xw  = x*w 
generate zw  = z*w 
generate xzw = x*z*w 
 
regress y x z w xz xw zw xzw v1 v2   (xtdpdsys or xtreg) 
 
quietly sum x 
global hi=r(max) 
global lo=r(min) 
quietly sum w 
global Hw=r(mean)+r(sd) 
global Lw=r(mean)-r(sd) 
quietly sum z 
global Hz=r(mean)+r(sd) 
global Lz=r(mean)-r(sd) 
quietly sum v1 
global m1=r(mean) 
quietly sum v2  
global m2=r(mean) 
 
global HzHw "x + ($Hz)*xz + ($Hw)*xw + ($Hz)*($Hw)*xzw"  
global HzLw "x + ($Hz)*xz + ($Lw)*xw + ($Hz)*($Lw)*xzw" 
global LzHw "x + ($Lz)*xz + ($Hw)*xw + ($Lz)*($Hw)*xzw" 
global LzLw "x + ($Lz)*xz + ($Lw)*xw + ($Lz)*($Lw)*xzw" 
 
/* simple slopes */ 
lincom $HzHw  
global b1 = r(estimate) 
lincom $HzLw  
global b2 = r(estimate) 
lincom $LzHw  
global b3 = r(estimate) 
lincom $LzLw  
global b4 = r(estimate) 
 
/* intercepts */ 
lincom _cons + $Hz*z + $Hw*w + $Hz*$Hw*zw + $m1*v1 + $m2*v2 
global c1 = r(estimate) 
lincom _cons + $Hz*z + $Lw*w + $Hz*$Lw*zw + $m1*v1 + $m2*v2 
global c2 = r(estimate) 
lincom _cons + $Lz*z + $Hw*w + $Lz*$Hw*zw + $m1*v1 + $m2*v2 
global c3 = r(estimate) 
lincom _cons + $Lz*z + $Lw*w + $Lz*$Lw*zw + $m1*v1 + $m2*v2 
global c4 = r(estimate) 
